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On 4 April 1864 the United States House of Representa-
tives unanimously passed a joint resolution condemning the
French efforts to establi.sh the Archduke Maximilian as Em-
peror of Mexico. The resolution stated:
Resolved: That the Congress of the Uiiitt-d States are un-
willing liy silence to have tlie nations of the world under
the impre.ssion that they are indifferent spectators of the
deplorable events now transpiring in the Republic of Mexico,
and that thc\ think fit to declare- ihut it does not accord
with thf policy of the United States to acknowledge any
monarcliica! government erected on the niins of :m>' re-
publican government in America under the anspiees of any
European power.'
Passing with almost no debate, this resolution has been
named the Davis resolution after the man who reported it
out of Committee, Henry Winter Davis, chairman of tiie
House Committee on Foregin Relations.^ It is the purpose
of tliis paper to demonstrate that John A. Kasson,
Congressman from Iowa, was the initiator of thi.s resolution.
While tlie evidence of his major role in conceiving this anti-
French resolution is clear, it is equally clear that no
satisfactory explanation of his motives can be offered.
The resolution had several immediate effects. First, the
French government was annoyed and angered, feeling this
resolution was intended as an open challenge to her honor."
Second, the Mexican government interpreted the resolution
to indicate the growing swell of opinion in the United States
favoring aid to President Benito Juarez In-leaguered IJberal
govermnent. Thiid, the resolution was an obvious effort on
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the part of Radical leaders to embarrass the Lincoln-Seward
administration's conduct of foreign policy. The Radicals hoped
to weaken the political position of Lincoln and strengthen that
of the Radical's fair-hair«! lioy, John C. Fremont, an open
candidate for the Republican presidential nomination in 18ß4.''
It is in conjunction with this latter point that Kasson's action
is difficult to explain.
Kasson was supposedly a strong
administration supporter. Yet, Lin-
coln and Seward had followed a con-
sistent policy vdth regard to the
French intervention in Mexico since it
began in Dec. 1861. They recognized
the sovereign right of France to de-
termine its 0W11 course of action, in-
cluding war, if it felt its rights had
been violated and Mexico offered no
acceptable alternative solution. Lin-
coln and Seward did not recognize
John A. Kasson France's right to alter the Mexican
fonn of govermnent, or to intervene in Mexico's internal
affairs. However, Lincoln and Seward were determined,
while the Civil War continued, to do no more than state
their position, without attempting to enforce their policy.^
It is difficult to comprehend that Ka.sson, who had served
the Lincoln administration as Assistant Postmaster General
and as a delegate to the International Postal Convention in
Paris in 1863, and, who was a friend of both Lincoln and
Postmaster Ceneral Montgomery Blair, could have prepared
the original draft of a resolution so critical of United States
foreign policy. His long connection with the Lincoln admin-
istration and his friendship with key figures in the govem-
ment led Edward Younger, Kasson's biographer, to describe
him in the winter of 1863-1864 and tbe spring of 1864 as
"an administration leader," and "a strong administration
man."" Furthermore, Younger stated: "Kasson's hand in the
renomination of Lincoln [in 1864] although by no means
crystal clear, is more discernible than that of his reticent Iowa
congressional colleagues."' Younger's description hardly fits
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tlie author of a most pointed political act intended to weaken
the administration.
Of course, traditionally, no explanation has been
necessary sinee Kasson has not been associated with this
resoluticHi. Historians have labelled the resolution tlie Davis
resolution, and nobody questioned tlie desire of Henry Winter
Davis, a House radieal leader, to embairass the Lincoln
administration. But, how did the resolution originate? Wliat
people were responsible for seeing it through to unanimous
adoption in the House? Three people had key roles, Henry
Winter Davis, John A. Kasson, and Matías Romero, Mexican
Minister to the United States. Since Romero served as coor-
dinator and information center for almost all actions in the
United States sympatlietic to Mexico, and sinee it is largely
through his papers and dispatches that the origin and the
course of the resolution can be followed, his return to the
United States in the late fall of 1863 as Minister to the United
States can serve as a starting point for understanding
Kasson's and Davis' involvement in United States policy
toward Mexico.
Romero had served as charge d'affaires for Mexico from
l>efore the outbreak of the Civil War imtil the spring of 1863.
He resigned then, only because the Juarez government could
not afford to give him sufficient funds to lobby in the
politically influeneial circles of Washington. He retiniied in
the fall of 1863 as Mexican Minister after assurances were
given him that he would receive an adecjuate salary and
an expense allowance sufficient to pennit effective lobbying
on his part. He had long been convinced he WÍLS not going
to achieve meaningful aid to Mexico through Seward and
the normal diplomatic channels. Immediately upon his return
he began to look for a house in which he could entertain
the infltiential of Washington at formal dinners. Just before
Christmas he rented a house, spent the next month funiishing
it, ac<|uiring and training a staff, and giving trial diimers
to work out any problems that might exist.*
Then, on the evening of Jan. 21, 1864, Romero began
earnestly to eat his way into Washington's inner political
and diplomatic circles. In less than sixty days he gave sixteen
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formal dinner parties, thirteen of them aimed primarily at
the Cabinet, the Senate and the House. Every member and
most of the Senate and House leaders — some fifty
congressmen in all, including Charles Sumner, John Sherman,
Lyman Trumbull, Benjamin Wade, Schuyler Colfax, Thaddens
Stevens, Zachariah Chandler, Reverdy Johason, John A.
Kasson, and Henry Winter Davis were guests at his table.
Vice President Hannibal Hamlin was entertained as were
Supreme Court Justices Samuel F. Miller and Stephen J.
Field. The dining continued after the initial sixty-day period
without any noticeable slackening, the only change being
that Romero began to repeat invitations to certain guests,
something he had rarely done during the first two months.^
Even before launching his intensive, and certainly ex-
pensive lobbying campaign, Romero collected dividends. On
the evening of Jan. IS. 1864, Kasson called on Romero with
some resolutions on Mexican affairs which were hostile
toward France that he wished to present in the House. Kasson
assured Romero they would pass unanimously. Romero
believed they most certainly would pass, but to assure their
success, Romero decided to press for their passage and to
let up on a set of alternate resolutions McDougal] had in-
troduced in the Senate. Romero had leamed tliat Sumner's
opposition in the Senate was impossible to combat suc-
cessfully. Sumner often agreed in principle with Romero,
yet disagreed over the method or mamier of objecting to
French intervention in Mexico, Sumner feared any strange
action might produce an undesired reaction on the part of
the French — undesired by the United States at least while
the Civil War continued.'"
After eonsulting with Romero again on Jan. 25th and 27th,
Kasson read his revised resolutions on the 28th. Two days
later, Henry Winter Davis, Chairman of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, visited Romero to discuss Mexican affairs.
Again Romero discovered a friend of Mexico. Davis had not
o
then read Kasson's resolution, but he intended to in the im-
mediate future. More significant was Davis' statement that
he had prepared resolutions on the same matter and if
Kasson's were similar in tone, he would see that Kasson's
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were treated as eniinating from the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee."
The matter rested for several weeks, then in late Feb.,
1864, Romero met with Kasson and Davis to inquire abont
the resolutions' progress. The two Congressmen believed the
French government was tired of the intervention and wanted
to leave Mexico. Romero eited the debates of the Corps
Législatif as reported in the Moniteur, Napoleon's official
newspaper., to convince Davis that more pressure was needed.
On March 2, 1864, the House passed a resolution asking the
executive for the correspondence on Mexico, a first step
toward building up pressure for a strong congressional course
of action.'^
In mid-Mareb Romero pushed for
action. He had just learned that, ear-
lier, Seward had called the members
of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee into his office and pressured
them not to act upon tlie Kasson or
Davis resolutions. Nothing quite so
stirred Romero to action between
1862 and 1865 as the chance to do
W. H. Seward i^ j^ jd ^¡jj^ Seward. On March 16th,
Secretary of State '
Da\is and Romero had a long con-
versation during which Romero's passionate, glowing presenta-
tion solicited from Davis an offer to take action at the next
Foreign Affairs Committee meeting. Romero's argument was
tiiat tlie resolutions would make the French expedition unpop-
ular in France, would cause Maximilian to vacillate in accept-
ing the crown, and would animate the Mexican people to great-
er resistance. Romero claimed this was possible at no risk of
the danger Seward and Davis claimed to fear of a strong
French reaction. There was no danger, as Romero carefully
explained, since, as tlie Seward-Sumner alliance controlled
the Senate on matters relating to tbe United States' Mexican
policy, this joint resolution would never take effect. On March
23rd, Davis infomied Romero his committee bad been ap-
proved recommendation of a substitute for Kasson's reso-
lutions which incorporated their intent into one stinging
resolution."
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Thus, on April 4th Romero's new political campaign for
Mexico won its first major victor)' with the introduction of a
resolution against French intervention in Mexico, and of
course, indirectly against the Seward-Lincoln conduct of
foreign relations. This resolution, the Kasson-Davis resolution,
but known, nevertheless, as the Davis resolution, passed 109-0.
As strong as Davis' resolution was. Romero was unhappy witli
it. He was sure that Seward had somehow persuaded Davis to
soften the resolution.*^
Romero also influenced Congressional criticism of
Seward's policy in May, 1864. On the 19tli, Romero showed
Davis the explanations Seward gave the French government
relative to Davis' April 4th resolution as published in the
Moniteur. Seward claimed the executive was sole formnlator
of foreign policy and further pointed out that, since the Davis
resolution was a joint resolution which tlie Senate had not
approved, it was not even a valid congressional statement
of policy. Davis' efforts to get political mileage out of this
were to be delayed until the winter of 1864-1865 due to the
recess of Congress at the lwginning of July. While their
reasons for wishing the Seward-Lincoln administration to fall
varied, Romero and Davis useil Seward's domestic political
blunder of belittling Congress' foreign policy role for their
ends. Davis, professing his belief that Congress was the chief
source of popularly expressed will, thought that Seward and
Lincoln were obstructing the implementation of the national
will regarding French involvement in Mexico. Bebind Davis'
theory of the source of sovereignty was his and his fellow
Radicals' practical problem: they wanted to exercise more
power and greater control over wartime and postwar
reconstruction policy.'^ Romero, on the other hand, in thinking
Seward was following a policy friendly to France and un-
friendly to Mexico, believed that as long as Lincoln remained
President, Seward would continue as architect of foreign
policy.
The roles of the three, Kasson, Davis, and Romero are
thus easy to describe. Kasson was tbe author of the resolution,
although it may have been slightly modified in Davis' Foreign
Relations Committee. Davis was the energy, the power and
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tilt' influence pushing the resolution through his committee
and onto the floor of the House. Moreover, sincx^  Davis had
a similar idea at that time, he was practically co-author.
Romero was the behind-the-scenes coordinator who kept Davis
informed and angry toward Seward. Thus, while the Mexican
archival material permits us to understand the roles of the
three individuals, and even the motivation of Davis and
Romero, one great mystery remains: Why did Kasson in-
troduce and support such a resolution? Perhaps Kasson's
status as "a strong administration man" will have to be
re-examined. Perhaps, also, it was merely an error, a blunder
on his part. Until more evidence is produced we can only
ponder the motives Kasson may have had for his seemingly
illogical action during the period from Jan. imtil April, 1864.
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Part I of the "Reminiscences" appeared in the Winter
issue of the ANNALS, No. 7,1971.
The author of Reininis-
cences of a Pioneer Boy was
horn in a log cabin on his
father's farm in 1857 and
grew up in the rugged hill
country of northeast Iowa in
AUamakee County. As a
young man he taught school,
was a hank clerk, and later
worked as surveyor, land
salesman and finally beeame
clerk of court in Waukon, the
countyseat In 1904 Orr be-
came a businessman, manag-
ing the telephone company for the next twenty-five years.
A well known amateur naturalist, Ellison Orr joined Dr.
Charles R. Keyes of the Iowa Archaeological Survey in 1934
and during the 1930s direc-ted the major excavations of the
Survey throughout the State. Although Orr was 77 years old
when he joined the Survey and retired finally at the age of
83, he made a lasting contribution to scholarly research. His
explorations were the first well-eontrolled and representative
excavations made in Iowa, and his manuscript archaeological
reports have been freijuently cited by professional archaeol-

